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Because analysts strategically allocate more effort to portfolio firms that are relatively more 
important for their career concerns, a firm’s information environment is impacted by other firms 
covered by its analysts. Controlling for analyst and firm characteristics, firms ranked relatively 
higher within each analyst’s portfolio based on market capitalization, trading volume, or 
institutional ownership receive more accurate, frequent, and informative earnings forecasts and 
recommendations from that analyst. Firms’ relative ranks vary widely across analysts, and thus 
are not firm characteristics. Firms have more transparent information environments when a 
larger proportion of their analysts consider them as relatively more important.  Analysts who 
engage in a greater extent of career concerns-driven effort allocation are more likely to 
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What determines the amount and quality of coverage a stock receives from an analyst? Prior 
research has identified many analyst and firm characteristics that affect analyst research (e.g., Clement 
(1999), Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999), Clement, Reese, and Swanson (2003), Frankel, Kothari, and Weber 
(2006), Ljungqvist et al. (2007), Du, Yu, and Yu (2013), Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu (2016), and Jiang, 
Kumar, and Law (2016)).1 But the reality of analyst coverage portfolios is that analysts face competing 
demands for their time from the stocks they cover. As a result, how much coverage a stock receives from 
an analyst should depend not only on its own characteristics, but also on the characteristics of other stocks 
followed by the analyst. However, we know little about how the variation in stock characteristics within 
an analyst’s portfolio impacts the way in which analysts provide research coverage on portfolio firms, and 
whether analysts’ response to intra-portfolio firm differences has real consequences. 
We aim to fill this void by examining how analysts allocate their effort among firms and whether 
their effort allocation decisions affect firm-level research quality and information transparency as well as 
their career outcomes. These are important questions that can lead to a more complete understanding of 
how analysts fulfill their information intermediary role, and of the constraints and incentives shaping their 
behavior. Answers to these questions can also provide new insights into the determinants of corporate 
transparency and improve empirical approaches to estimating the impact of an analyst on a firm’s 
information environment.  
Our investigation is built on the premise that financial analysts, like any economic agent, have 
limited time, energy, and resources (Kahneman (1973)), a notion that is consistent with extant evidence in 
the literature. For example, Clement (1999) shows that portfolio complexity measured by portfolio size 
has an adverse impact on analyst earnings forecast accuracy, and Cohen, Lou, and Malloy (2014) find that 
analysts with larger portfolios are less likely to ask questions on firms’ earnings conference calls. Faced 
                                                            
1  These variables include, e.g., the analyst’s forecasting experience, portfolio complexity, employer size, 
employment history, cultural background, and political view and the firm’s potential for generating investment 
banking business and trading commission and its institutional ownership.  
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with these constraints, analysts must be selective in allocating their attention and effort to firms in their 
portfolios in order to maximize their utility function as determined by career concern considerations.  
Analysts’ compensation and upward mobility in the labor market depends on their reputation and 
ability to generate commission revenue for their brokerage houses and win favorable ratings from buy-
side institutional clients (Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011)). Importantly, firms within an analyst’s 
research portfolio can have differential impacts on the analyst’s compensation, reputation, and mobility. 
For example, firms with large trading volumes and institutional ownership represent more lucrative 
sources of commission fee revenue for brokerage houses (Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006)). In 
addition, institutional investors participate in annual evaluations of sell-side analysts, and their 
assessments form the basis of the selection of “All-Star” analysts and the allocation of buy-side investors’ 
trades and commissions across brokerage firms (Maber, Groysberg, and Healy (2014) and Ljungqvist et al. 
(2007)). In a similar vein, because large firms are more visible in the capital market, generating large 
trading activities and attracting significant institutional following, an analyst’s performance in researching 
these firms may also have a larger impact on her compensation and reputation in the labor market (Hong 
and Kubik (2003)). 
Given the heterogeneity along these dimensions among firms within an analyst’s portfolio, the 
quality of the analyst’s research services for each firm is likely to vary with the firm’s relative importance 
for the analyst’s career concerns. Based on this intuition, we develop a “career concerns” hypothesis, 
which contends that analysts devote more (less) effort to researching firms that are relatively more (less) 
important from their career concern perspectives. Following from the argument above, we identify firms 
of relatively high (or low) importance to analysts using a firm’s relative rank in an analyst’s portfolio 
based on market capitalization, trading volume, and institutional ownership. Importantly, because a firm’s 
relative rank is determined by not only its own characteristics but also those of other firms in an analyst’s 
portfolio, there is wide variation in a firm’s relative rank across analysts covering the firm. Aggregating 
the research efforts a firm receives from all of its analysts, the “career concerns” hypothesis further 
predicts that firms whose relative rank is high (or low) in a larger proportion of its analysts’ portfolios are 
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associated with more (less) transparent information environment and less (more) information asymmetry. 
This implies that a firm’s information environment and hence cost of capital can be influenced by the 
characteristics of the other firms that its analysts follow.  We note that while our discussion here focuses 
on the benefits of coverage effort to analysts, we do not assume that analysts face the same cost of 
coverage across firms.  Consequently, we address coverage costs in the empirical analysis.  
Of course, as information intermediaries, analysts will consider their potential impact on a firm’s 
information environment when allocating effort. The nature of the equilibrium will depend on how effort 
translates into accuracy for each stock and the relative reward for accuracy on stocks with higher versus 
lower institutional interest.  Our analysis will uncover the extent to which career concerns affect analyst 
effort allocation, and hence the information environment of firms. Empirically, we test whether analyst 
effort allocation is consistent with career concerns dominated by institutional investor interest, or by 
incentives to add the most information to under-followed stocks. 
We begin by analyzing the earnings forecasts and stock recommendations issued by a large 
sample of sell-side analysts from 1983 to 2012.2 Evidence from our analysis supports the conclusion that 
the dominant career concerns incentive is to exert more effort on firms that—within the context of their 
own portfolio—are more important to institutional investors. Specifically, analysts provide more accurate 
earnings forecasts and more frequent earnings forecast revisions for firms ranked higher based on market 
capitalization, trading volume and institutional ownership relative to other firms in the same analyst’s 
portfolio. It is worth noting that these results are robust to controlling for a large array of pertinent firm 
and analyst characteristics. Our findings are also robust to controlling for analyst fixed effects, firm fixed 
effects, or analyst-firm pair fixed effects. The robustness to analyst-firm pair effects is especially notable 
because we are holding the pairing constant so that variation in the importance of the firm to the analyst 
                                                            
2 Our examination of earnings forecasts and stock recommendations does not imply that they are the sole metrics 
based on which analysts are assessed and rewarded. In fact, institutional investors and brokerage houses evaluate 
analysts more broadly based on their knowledge and understanding of firms and industries and their activities of 
producing value relevant information or helping institutional clients obtain such information (Brown et al. (2015), 
Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011), and Maber, Groysberg, and Healy (2014)). We assume that the properties of 
earnings forecasts and stock recommendations are signals of the effort and resources devoted by analysts to all of 
these activities related to a given firm. 
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comes largely from variations in the other firms that the analyst covers. In addition, we find that the 
impact of a firm’s relative importance on earnings forecast behavior is stronger for “busy” analysts, i.e., 
those covering larger portfolios. This evidence is consistent with the intuition that larger portfolios are 
more likely to hit the constraint created by analysts’ limited time, energy, and resources, making it even 
more critical for the analysts to be strategic in their research activities. As such, it lends more credence to 
our “career concerns” hypothesis.  
Further analyses suggest that the stock market recognizes the effort allocation incentives of 
analysts. Specifically, we find that earnings forecast revisions and stock recommendation changes issued 
by analysts on firms that are relatively more important in their portfolios elicit stronger stock price 
reactions, indicative of analyst research on these firms conveying greater information content.  
We then extend our investigation to study the effects of analysts’ career concerns-driven effort 
allocation on firms’ information environment. Our results show that firms where a larger proportion of 
their analysts consider them relatively more important are associated with lower bid-ask spreads, higher 
stock market liquidity, and lower costs of capital. This is consistent with the interpretation that analysts 
commit more effort to research and information production for these firms, thereby contributing to more 
transparent information environments. We also exploit exogenous losses of analyst coverage due to 
brokerage house closures and mergers and find that firms losing coverage by analysts who rank them as 
relatively more important experience greater declines in information transparency, compared to firms 
losing coverage by analysts who rank them as relatively less important. Thus, analysts’ effort allocation 
decisions have real consequences for firms and investors.   
Finally, we examine the career outcome implications of analysts’ effort allocation. If the pattern 
of analyst effort allocation we document is a rational response to career concerns, we expect favorable 
career outcomes to be related to the degree to which analysts engage in such effort allocation. We 
measure an analyst’s engagement of career concern-based effort allocation by the differences in earnings 
forecast accuracy and frequency between the higher and lower ranked firms within the analyst’s portfolio. 
Consistent with our expectation, we find that the extent of an analyst’s career concern-based effort 
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allocation is significantly and positively related to the probability of the analyst being voted as an “All 
Star” and moving to more prestigious brokerage houses. The explanatory power of the differential 
forecast frequency and accuracy between high and low ranked firms is incremental to the analyst’s 
average forecast frequency and accuracy for her portfolio. These results provide a logical explanation for 
the analyst effort allocation pattern we observe. 
Our study makes several contributions that advance our understanding of the determinants of 
analyst behavior and firms’ information environment. First, we contribute to the sell-side analyst 
literature by exploring within-analyst portfolio variations in analyst behavior. This approach represents a 
novel departure from, as well as an important complement to, prior studies focusing on either cross-
analyst or cross-firm variations. It enables us to provide new insights into how analysts allocate their 
limited attention and resources to firms within their portfolios. Specifically, our findings go beyond the 
average effect of analyst and firm attributes and highlight the fact that the same analyst does not treat all 
firms in her portfolio equally and that the same firm does not receive equal amounts of attention and 
effort from all the analysts covering it. Instead, analysts strategically allocate more research effort to firms 
that are relatively more important for their career concerns.  
In addition, we show that a firm’s aggregate relative importance across its analysts has an effect 
on its information environment incremental to firm and analyst characteristics. Given that a firm’s relative 
rank in an analyst’s portfolio is partly determined by characteristics of other firms in the portfolio, our 
finding suggests that the quality of a firm’s information environment is not entirely a function of its own 
attributes but also those of firms with which it shares analyst coverage.   
Our results also suggest that the common approach of using the number of analysts following a 
firm as a measure of the firm’s information environment can benefit from incorporating the firm’s 
average relative importance in its analysts’ portfolios. A larger number of analysts covering a firm does 
not necessarily translate into more information production and a more transparent information 
environment for the firm if it often finds itself at the bottom of its analysts’ priority lists and thus receives 
little research attention.  
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Finally, our investigation sheds new light on factors that influence analysts’ career outcomes. 
Specifically, our evidence suggests that the way in which analysts allocate their effort among portfolio 
firms is an important determinant of their labor market outcomes. Prior research finds that an analyst’s 
average earnings forecast accuracy has a significant impact on her career prospects (e.g., Mikhail, 
Walther, and Willis (1999) and Hong and Kubik (2003)). We show that an analyst’s forecasting 
performance differential between the high and low ranked firms within her portfolio, which captures the 
extent of the analyst’s career concern-based effort allocation, matters as well.  
 
2. The determination of analyst portfolios 
Before we move on to the empirical part of the paper, it is important to discuss the determination 
of an analyst’s portfolio and whether it affects our research question and findings. The size and 
composition of an analyst’s portfolio are driven by many factors, some of which are outside analysts’ or 
brokerage firms’ control, such as the number of firms in an industry, the industry’s complexity, major 
players, the level of competiveness and the broader competitors of a given firm (Hsu, Li, Ma and Phillips, 
2017). For example, by virtue of their size, dominant position, and interest from institutional investors, 
some companies, such as Apple Inc., are likely to be in the portfolios of most, if not all, of the analysts 
covering their industries. To the extent that analyst portfolios are determined mainly by exogenous forces, 
it is a fairly straightforward question and empirical exercise with respect to whether/how analysts allocate 
their efforts trying to maximize their utility function defined by career concern considerations. 
However, brokerage firms and analysts typically have at least some discretion over how many 
and which firms an analyst covers. For example, conversations with sell-side analysts, confirmed by our 
sample descriptive statistics, suggest that more seasoned analysts with higher quality and better reputation 
have more control over their research portfolios and tend to cover more firms. To the extent that analyst 
portfolios are endogenously determined, the incentives that affect analyst effort allocation may also play a 
role in determining which firms an analyst covers. In particular, our “career concerns” hypothesis would 
imply that, given the choice, analysts would choose to cover firms which are more important to their 
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career development. This tendency will bias against finding evidence of analysts playing favorites among 
portfolio firms, because the portfolio consists only of “favorites”. In the extreme case where firms in an 
analyst’s portfolio are equally important to the analyst’s career outcomes, we would not expect to observe 
any differential treatment of firms by the analyst. However, given the degree of heterogeneity across 
firms in a typical industry, and the lack of complete control over coverage choices, there will be variation 
in the relative importance of firms within an analyst’s portfolio. As such, our “career concerns” 
hypothesis will continue to be relevant. In fact, we find stronger evidence of career concerns-driven effort 
allocation when the firms in the analyst’s portfolio are more heterogeneous.  
Additionally, analyst coverage decisions may also by motivated by considerations related to 
competition among analysts and firms’ current information environments. For example, an analyst may 
prefer to cover firms that are smaller, with low trading volume, analyst coverage, and institutional interest, 
either because there is less competition from other analysts or because they believe their research can 
have a larger marginal impact on these firms’ information environments. While some analysts may follow 
this strategy, it is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run. Given that the brokerage industry primarily 
serves institutional investors, it is difficult for brokerage houses to support analysts covering small and 
thinly traded stocks with low institutional interest. The compensation schemes for sell-side analysts also 
provide disincentives for covering these firms, because a large component of analysts’ compensation is 
determined by the ratings they receive from institutional clients and the order flow they can generate. In 
addition, if analysts indeed actively apply this strategy – i.e. prefer covering firms with poorer 
information environment, then in equilibrium the result would be similar information environments across 
all firms. However, in reality, extant evidence establishes that different firms tend to have very different 
analyst coverage and information environments, suggesting that this strategy does not play a major role in 
determining analyst coverage decisions.  Rather, given the incentives they face, it is more likely that 
within the group of career-critical firms an analyst covers, the analyst will further adjust effort to equate 
the value of outcomes across those firms. The net result of these forces is an equilibrium where the value-
weighted information environment impact is equalized across firms.  
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The equilibrium forces notwithstanding, empirically we are able to hold constant firm-level 
characteristics, such as having a weaker information environment, analyst-level characteristics, such as 
being inherently more skilled than other analysts, as well as analyst-firm pair characteristics, such as 
analysts being better at covering a specific firm. Our identification relies on changes in the relative 
importance of a firm in an analyst’s portfolio, due to changes in the other firms the analyst covers. 
 
3. Sample description, variable construction, and summary statistics 
The dataset used in our study is constructed from multiple sources. Analyst earnings forecasts and 
stock recommendations are from Institutional Broker Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Firm characteristics and 
stock returns are obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP.  Information on institutional ownership is from 
the Thomson 13F database. Our sample period is from 1983 to 2012. Following prior literature, e.g., 
Clement (1999), we restrict the sample to earnings forecasts made during the first 11 months of a fiscal 
year, i.e., with a minimum forecast horizon of 30 days, although our results are not sensitive to this 
restriction.  
Our primary measure of analyst effort is the accuracy of an analyst’s earnings forecast for a firm, 
which is based on the forecast made by the analyst that is closest to the firm’s fiscal year end. We 
construct the analyst forecast accuracy measure by comparing an analyst’s absolute forecast error on a 
firm to the average absolute forecast error of other analysts following the same firm during the same time 
period. This measure is initially developed by Clement (1999) to remove firm-year effects in analyst 
forecast accuracy and is widely adopted in the literature (e.g., Malloy, 2005; Clement et al., 2007; De 
Franco and Zhou, 2009; Horton and Serafeim, 2012; Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu, 2016). Specifically, the 
relative earnings forecast accuracy (PMAFEi,j,t) is computed as the absolute forecast error (AFEi,j,t) of 
analyst i for firm j in year t minus the mean analyst absolute forecast error for firm j at year t (MAFEj,t), 
then scaled by the mean absolute forecast error for firm j at year t to reduce heteroskedasticity (Clement, 






PMAFEi,j,t is an analyst’s forecast accuracy relative to all other analysts covering the same firm during the 
same time period and thus filters out differences across companies, year and industry (Ke and Yu, 2006). 
Lower values of PMAFE correspond to more accurate forecasts.  
Our second measure of analyst effort is the frequency of earnings forecast updates, which is equal 
to the number of annual forecasts made by an analyst for a firm during a fiscal year with a minimum 
forecast horizon of 30 days. This variable has been used by prior studies to measure the amount of analyst 
effort (e.g., Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) and Merkley, Michaely, and Pacelli (2016)). However, its 
caveat is that it does not directly speak to the quality of analyst research on a given firm.  
We construct a number of analyst and forecast characteristics that previous research has identified 
as important factors explaining analyst performance. Specifically, we control for analyst experience 
because Clement (1999) shows that it is related to forecast accuracy. We consider both general and firm-
specific forecasting experience, which are calculated, respectively, as the total number of years that 
analyst i appeared in I/B/E/S (Gexpi) and the total number of years since analyst i first provided an 
earnings forecast for firm j (Fexpij). We measure the resources available to an analyst using an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if the analyst works for a top-decile brokerage house (Top10i) based on the 
number of analysts employed, and zero otherwise. This variable can also serve as an indicator for analyst 
ability, to the extent that larger brokerage houses attract more talented analysts. We also measure the 
complexity of an analyst’s portfolio by the number of firms in analyst i's portfolio (PortSizei) and the 
number of 2-digit SICs represented by these firms (SIC2i). Finally, we control for the number of days 
(AGEij) between analyst i’s forecast for firm j and the firm’s fiscal year end. Clement (1999) and Clement 
and Tse (2005) find that AGE is positively related to relative forecast errors, emphasizing the need to 
control for timeliness. Appendix A provides detailed definitions of these variables. 
Because the I/B/E/S database is left censored, we cannot determine how much experience analysts 
have prior to the first year of available data. To mitigate this problem, we follow Clement (1999) to 
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exclude analysts who appear in the first year of the database (1983). Forecasts made in 1984 are also 
excluded from our analysis because there would be little variation in the experience variables for that year 
(i.e., the experience variables can take on the value of only 0 or 1 in 1984).3 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the main variables used throughout this paper. Panel A 
presents the unadjusted values. The median absolute forecast error is 0.07, and the median frequency of 
forecast revisions in a year is 3. The median analyst in our sample has been providing forecasts for 4 
years, and covering the typical firm in our sample for 2 years. The median number of days between 
forecasts and the fiscal year end is 73. The median analyst covers 14 firms each year, which represents 3 
distinct 2-digit SIC codes. Approximately 49% of forecasts are issued by analysts working for a top-
decile brokerage house based on the number of analysts employed by each brokerage. These values are 
comparable to those in prior studies (Clement and Tse, 2005; Clement, Koonce, and Lopez, 2007; 
Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu, 2016). 
Panel B of Table 1 presents firm-year-mean-adjusted values. Clement (1999) finds that removing 
firm-year effects from dependent and independent variables improves the likelihood of identifying 
performance differences across sell-side analysts compared to a model that includes firm and year fixed 
effects. This is due to a firm’s earnings predictability varying over time. We observe that the median 
values in Panel B are comparable to those reported in prior studies (e.g. Clement, 1999; Clement, Koonce, 
and Lopez, 2007; Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu, 2016).   
 Our key explanatory variables are the measures that capture the relative importance of a firm in 
an analyst’s portfolio. We first construct the measures based on the firm’s market capitalization at the 
previous year end. To capture the relative importance of a specific firm for analysts following multiple 
firms, we create a dummy variable High, which takes the value of 1 if a firm’s market capitalization is in 
the top quartile of all firms the analyst covers in that year, and zero otherwise.  We also create a dummy 
variable Low, which takes the value of 1 if a firm’s market capitalization is in the bottom quartile of all 
                                                            
3 Our results are robust to the inclusion of those observations in 1983 and 1984. 
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firms the analyst covers in that year, and zero otherwise.4 We also construct the High and Low indicators 
based on a firm’s trading volume in the prior year and institutional ownership at the previous year end. 
Our goal here is not to take a stand on which measure of relative importance is most accurate. Rather, by 
using three different metrics, we hope to ensure that whatever pattern of analyst effort allocation we find 
is robust across alternative measures. 
There is considerable variation in a firm’s relative ranking across analysts. For example, using a 
firm’s market capitalization to capture its relative importance, we find that conditional on a firm being 
ranked as high by at least one analyst, only 37% of the other analysts covering the firm rank it as high. 
Conditional on a firm being ranked as low by at least one analyst, the firm is ranked low by 56% of other 
analysts. 
Panel C of Table 1 provides a comparison of several analyst forecast and firm characteristics 
between firms in the High and Low portions of analyst portfolios. Not surprisingly, we find that compared 
to firms in the Low group, firms in the High group are larger, more actively traded, and receive more 
institutional investment. They also receive more frequent and more accurate earnings forecasts from 
analysts, providing some preliminary support for our career concerns hypothesis.  
 
4. Evidence on how analysts allocate effort 
In this section, we examine how analysts allocate their effort across firms in their portfolios. We 
measure analyst effort using the earnings forecast accuracy and revision frequency.  
 
4.1. Earnings forecast accuracy 
Our career concerns hypothesis predicts that analysts make more accurate earnings forecasts for 
firms that are relatively more important in their portfolios. To test this prediction, we regress an analyst’s 
relative forecast accuracy on a firm (PMAFEi,j,t) on our key explanatory variables, the High and Low 
indicators, along with an array of analyst characteristics that previous research has identified as related to 
                                                            
4 We require analysts covering at least four firms in a given year. Our results still hold without this requirement.  
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differences in relative forecast accuracy among analysts.5 More specifically, the model is specified as 
follows. 
 
PMAFEi,j,t  = β0 + β1Highi,j,t + β2Lowi,j,t + β3DGexpi,j,t + β4DFexpi,j,t + β5DAgei,j,t + β6DPortsizei,j,t  
                 + β7DSIC2i,j,t + β8DTop10i,j,t + β9All-stari,j,t + εi,j,t              (1) 
 
The “D” preceding some variables indicates that these variables are de-meaned at the firm-year level to 
remove firm-year fixed effects. The standard errors are estimated by double clustering at the firm and 
analyst level. Note that while our test is stated in terms of forecast accuracy, the dependent variable in this 
regression is an analyst’s relative forecast error. Lower relative forecast errors indicate higher forecast 
accuracy. Based on the career concerns hypothesis, we expect the coefficient of High (Low) to be 
negative (positive).  
Panel A of Table 2 reports the baseline regression results. In column (1), the relative importance 
of a specific firm in an analyst portfolio is measured using its equity market capitalization. As predicted, 
the coefficient on High is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient on 
Low is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that analysts make more 
accurate earnings forecasts for firms that are relatively more important in their portfolios and are 
consistent with the prediction of our career concerns hypothesis that analysts devote more resources to 
researching these firms. Economically, firms that belong to the relatively more important group receive 
earnings forecasts that are on average 1.928% more accurate than firms not in that group. Similarly, firms 
that belong to the relatively less important group receive earnings forecasts that are on average 1.594% 
less accurate. The average difference in earnings forecast accuracy between the high and low groups of 
firms is 3.522% (=1.594-(-1.928)). To put this effect into context, we compare it to the effects of some 
                                                            
5 Because the dependent variable by construction is free of firm-year effects, there is no need to control for firm 
characteristics. Not surprisingly, we obtain very similar results if we include a set of firm characteristics, such as a 
firm’s size, trading volume, institutional holding, book-to-market ratio, past stock returns, and analyst coverage, as 
additional controls. This provides further assurance that the High and Low indicators do not simply pick up the 
effects of the variables they are based on.  
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other determinants of forecast accuracy. We find that the high-low accuracy differential is equivalent to 
the effect of over 13 years of general forecasting experience, over 5 years of firm-specific forecasting 
experience, 1.34 times the effect of working for a top-decile brokerage firm and about the same as the 
effect of being an all-star analyst. We obtain very similar results when we measure the relative 
importance of a firm by trading volume in column (2) or by institutional ownership in column (3).   
The coefficients on control variables are mostly consistent with previous studies (e.g., Clement 
(1999)). For example, analysts with more general or firm-specific forecasting experience issue more 
accurate earnings forecasts, while analysts covering more industries issue less accurate forecasts. Analysts 
employed by the largest brokerage houses have better forecasting performance, which could be due to 
more resources being available at large brokerage houses or analysts working for large brokerage houses 
being more talented. More stale forecasts tend to be less accurate.6 
In further analysis, we augment the regression model specified in equation (1) by controlling for 
analyst fixed effects.7 Doing so can help us focus on the within-analyst variations in the High and Low 
indicators and mitigate the concern that our findings are driven by some time-invariant analysts’ 
characteristics such as experience, talent or personal cost of coverage effort. Results in Panel B of Table 2 
show that the coefficient on High continues to be significantly negative while the coefficient on Low 
remains significantly positive. The magnitude of the coefficients is slightly different from that in Panel A. 
For example, based on equity market capitalization, the relative earnings forecast error is 1.566% lower 
for relatively more important firms and 1.302% higher for relatively less important firms. These results 
indicate that for the same analyst, firms that are more important in her portfolio receive more accurate 
earnings forecasts than firms that are less important in her portfolio.  
In Panel C, we replace the analyst fixed effects with firm fixed effects and in Panel D, we replace 
them with analyst-firm pair fixed effects. These alternative specifications serve two important purposes. 
                                                            
6 Our results are also robust to controlling for how long an analyst has covered a firm’s industry and whether there is 
investment banking relationship between a firm and an analyst’s employer. We identify investment banking 
relationships based on whether the analyst’s employer has been a lead underwriter or co-manager of the firm’s 
equity offering (IPO or SEO).  
7 Our sample includes about 7,200 unique analysts, 10,500 unique firms, and 200,500 analyst-firm pairs. 
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First, they accentuate the within-firm variations or variations within each analyst-firm pair. Second, they 
allow us to further control for the costs faced by analysts in covering a firm, which may affect their effort 
allocation decisions. To the extent that certain firm characteristics are related to how difficult or costly it 
is for analysts to cover the firm, our firm fixed-effects will absorb all of these characteristics. If some 
analysts are particularly good at covering a particular industry or firm, this effect will be absorbed by our 
analyst-firm fixed effects. Thus, while we recognize that the cost of covering firms is not equal, our firm 
and analyst-firm pair fixed effects justify our focus on the relative benefits of coverage, which, given our 
empirical approach, should also rank firms on relative net benefits.  
We find that the coefficients on the High and Low indicators retain their signs and statistical 
significance. These results suggest that for the same firm (as in Panel C) or the same firm covered by the 
same analyst (as in Panel D), the accuracy of forecasts received by the firm varies with its relative 
importance in the analyst’s portfolio. The fact that the results are robust to analyst-firm pair fixed effects 
is particularly reassuring because in these regressions, the variation in relative rankings comes primarily 
from changes in what other firms are in the analyst’s portfolio, as well as changes in the subject firm over 
time after it was originally added. This identification approach relies on time-series variation in a firm’s 
high/low status within the analyst’s portfolio.  One concern would be that there is not enough such 
variation. It turns out, however, that changes in the composition of an analyst’s portfolio are frequent 
enough that conditional on a firm being ranked high (low) by an analyst, this firm has an 18% (25%) 
probability of being ranked non-high (non-low) in the following year by the same analyst. Finally, the 
analyst-firm fixed-effect results also help us address another potential concern, which is that the most 
important firms only get added to the best analysts’ portfolios. If so, then the most important firms would 
enter a portfolio as high and stay high, being absorbed by the pairing fixed-effect. The results in this 
specification are based on within-portfolio variation over time.   
Gormley and Matsa (2014) show that de-meaning variables may produce inconsistent estimates 
and distort the results, and suggest using the raw values of variables and controlling for fixed effects 
instead. Therefore, we estimate an alternative specification of model (1), in which we control for firm-
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year pair fixed effects in lieu of de-meaning the dependent variable as well as some of the independent 
variables. Table 3 presents the regression results. We continue to find a significantly negative coefficient 
for the High indicator and a significantly positive coefficient for the Low indicator, allowing us to 
conclude that de-meaning variables does not have a material impact on statistical inferences in our 
context. Therefore, we use the de-meaned specification as our main model to be consistent with the prior 
literature on analysts, and when necessary show robustness to the non-demeaned specification. Overall, 
the results from Tables 2 and 3 lend strong support to the career concerns hypothesis.8 
An analyst could further adjust his or her effort to equalize incremental impact within the career-
critical firms (the High group). If so, then if we sort the High group by standard information environment 
variables such as size, we will find no difference in forecast error across firms within the High group. In 
untabulated analysis, we do just that and find that the forecast errors for the larger firms within the High 
group are not different from those for the small firms within the High group.  From this we conclude that 
an analyst first identifies and focuses on the firms within his or her portfolio that are relatively most 
important to his or her career, and then further adjusts effort to equalize the incremental impact of his or 
her effort across those career-critical firms. 
 
4.2. Earnings forecast revision frequency 
Earnings forecast update frequency is another widely used proxy for analyst effort in the literature 
(e.g., Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) and Merkley, Michaely, and Pacelli (2016)). Based on the career 
concerns hypothesis, we expect firms of relatively high importance within an analyst’s portfolio to 
receive more frequent earnings forecast updates. We reestimate equation (1) in Section 4.1 while 
replacing the dependent variable with the earnings forecast update frequency (DFREQ), measured as the 
number of annual forecasts issued by an analyst each year during the 360 to 30 days prior to a covered 
                                                            
8 We also examine the likelihood of an analyst being a leader or follower in issuing earnings forecasts for a firm. 
Untabulated results show that analysts are neither more likely to be leaders nor followers when making forecasts on 
their most important firms in their portfolio, but there is some evidence that they are more likely to be followers 
when it comes to their least important firms. These findings are consistent with analysts devoting less effort to the 
least important firms. 
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company’s fiscal year end minus the average number of earnings forecast revisions issued by all analysts 
for that firm in that year (Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011)). Appendix B presents the results. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that analysts update earnings forecasts more frequently for firms 
that are relatively more important in their portfolios. With a median frequency of 3 and an interquartile 
range of 2 to 5, there is less variation in frequency to explain, yet, the results are still economically 
meaningful. The average difference in the earnings forecast frequency between the high and low groups 
of firms based on their equity market capitalization is equivalent to the effect of about 5.3 years of general 
forecasting experience, 0.63 years of firm-specific forecasting experience, half as big as the effect of 
being employed at a top-decile brokerage firm and about 40% of the effect of being an all-star analyst. 
Our results are also robust to controlling for analyst fixed effects, firm fixed effects, and analyst-firm pair 
fixed effects. 
 
4.3. Busy analysts 
The career concerns hypothesis is built on the fact that analysts have limited time, energy, and 
resources. Faced with these constraints, analysts devote more effort to collecting and analyzing 
information for relatively more important firms in their portfolios.  When analysts cover many firms, 
these constraints would be more binding and have a larger impact on analyst behavior. Therefore, we 
expect to observe stronger patterns of effort allocation among “busy” analysts, i.e., those who cover a 
large portfolio of firms. To formally test this prediction, we define “busy” analysts as those whose 
portfolio size in a given year is greater than the sample median and classify the other analysts as “non-
busy”. We then re-estimate the forecast accuracy regression for busy and non-busy analysts separately. 
We expect that the difference in forecast accuracy between the high and low groups of firms is more 
pronounced for busy analysts. On the other hand, a countervailing effect may also be at work. In 
particular, we find that analysts with larger portfolios tend to have significantly longer general forecasting 
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experience and are more likely to be all-stars and employed by the largest brokerage houses.9 To the 
extent that “busy” analysts have more experience, higher ability, and more resources at their disposal, 
there may be a lesser need for them to ration efforts to firms of low importance so as to devote more 
attention to firms of high importance.  
Table 4 presents the regression results, with Panels A and B for busy and non-busy analysts, 
respectively. We find that for non-busy analysts, the coefficients on the High and Low dummies continue 
to be negative and positive respectively, but their statistical significance is relatively low, with the High 
dummy’s coefficient only significant in one out of three models. In contrast, for busy analysts, the 
coefficients on the High and Low dummies are highly significant with the expected signs in all models. 
Moreover, when we compare the coefficients between the subsamples, we find that the coefficient on the 
High dummy is always more negative for busy analysts than for non-busy analysis (with the p-value for 
the between-subsample difference being 0.016, 0.005, and 0.014 across the three models), and that the 
coefficient on the Low dummy is always more positive for busy analysts than for non-busy analysis (with 
the p-value for the between-subsample difference being 0.011, 0.026, and 0.018). As a result, the high-
low coefficient difference is much larger for busy analysts (ranging from 4.37% to 4.67%) than for non-
busy analysts (from 1.57% to 1.82%). This is consistent with our conjecture that busy analysts face 
greater time and resource constraints and thus engage in more strategic effort allocation among firms in 
their portfolios.10 
 
4.4. Further evidence on analyst effort allocation: Stock price impact of analyst research 
Given our evidence of analysts issuing more accurate and frequent earnings forecasts for 
relatively more important firms in their portfolios, we next investigate the stock market reactions to their 
earnings forecast revisions and stock recommendations. If investors recognize that analysts allocate time 
                                                            
9 In our sample, an analyst’s portfolio size is significantly and positively related to the analyst’s general forecasting 
experience, whether the analyst works for a top broker, and whether the analyst is an all-star, with the correlation 
coefficients being 0.239, 0.065, and 0.115, respectively. 




strategically across firms, we expect stronger market reactions to analysts’ research on relatively more 
important firms in their portfolios. Analyzing the stock market reactions to analyst research can also 
address a potential caveat with using the earnings forecast accuracy measure. Specifically, analysts can 
potentially produce more accurate earnings forecasts by piggybacking on the information produced by 
other analysts and revealed through their published research including earnings forecasts. If an analyst’s 
earnings forecast largely reflects the information contained in previously published research by other 
analysts, it would carry little new information content even though it may be more accurate. Therefore, 
we would expect its stock price impact to be muted at best. On the other hand, if the analyst’s forecast 
indeed carries significant information content, its release should generate stronger stock market reactions.    
 
4.4.1. Stock price reactions to analyst earnings forecast revisions  
We first examine the market reaction to forecast revisions. We expect to observe more 
pronounced market reaction to forecast revisions issued by analysts for their relatively more important 
firms. To test this prediction, we estimate the following regression model.  
 
CAR i,j,t = β0 + β1FR*High i,j,t + β2FR*Low i,j,t + β3FR i,j,t + β4Highi,j,t + β5Lowi,j,t + β6Gexpi,j,t  
                + β7Fexpi,j,t + β8Agei,j,t + β9Portsizei,j,t + β10SIC2i,j,t + β11Top10i,j,t + β12All-stari,j,t  
                + β13Sizej,t + β14 Log(Trading Volume)j,t  + β15Institutional Holdingj,t + β16BMj,t + β17Past Retj,t   
                + β18No. of Analystsj,t + Year FE + ε i,j,t                                                                   (2) 
 
This model is similar to that used by Bradley, Gokkaya and Liu (2016). The dependent variable is 
the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal stock returns over a 3-day event window (-1, 1) around a 
forecast revision.11 The key independent variables are the forecast revision (FR) and its interaction terms 
with High and Low. We control for other analyst and firm characteristics as in equation (1) as well as year 
                                                            
11 The abnormal stock returns are denominated in percentage points, and we exclude analyst forecast revisions as 
well as stock recommendation changes that coincide with firms’ earnings announcement dates. 
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fixed effects, and adjust standard errors for clustering at the firm and analyst level. We define forecast 
revision (FR) as the difference between the new forecast and the old forecast, scaled by the absolute value 
of the old forecast.12 A positive FR represents an upward revision, and a negative FR represents a 
downward revision.  
Table 5 presents the regression results. Columns (1)-(3) are based on using the market 
capitalization, trading volume, and institutional ownership to measure the relative importance of firms. 
We find that the coefficient on forecast revision (FR) is significantly positive.  This suggests that the 
stock market responds positively to upward revisions and negatively to downward revisions, and larger 
forecast revisions elicit greater stock price reactions. More relevant for our purpose are the interaction 
terms between forecast revision and the High and Low indicators. We find that High*FR has a 
significantly positive coefficient in two out of three models while Low*FR has a significantly negative 
coefficient in all three model specifications. These results indicate that conditional on the direction and 
magnitude of forecast revisions, the stock market reacts more strongly to forecast revisions issued by 
analysts for relatively more important firms in their portfolios. In other words, the forecast revisions 
received by relatively more important firms in an analyst’s portfolio tend to be more informative. This is 
again consistent with the career concerns hypothesis, which predicts greater information production effort 
by analysts on these firms. 
 
4.4.2. Stock price reactions to stock recommendations  
Next we examine the market reaction to stock recommendation revisions. Loh and Mian (2006) 
find that analysts who have superior forecast accuracy also issue more informative stock 
recommendations. Brown et al. (2015) document that analysts’ top motivation for issuing accurate 
forecasts is to use these forecasts as inputs for their corresponding stock recommendations. Therefore, we 
expect stronger market reactions to stock recommendations issued by analysts on their relatively more 
important firms. We estimate the following regression model to test our prediction.  
                                                            




CAR i,j,t = β0 + β1High i,j,t + β2Low i,j,t + β3Gexp i,j,t + β4Fexp i,j,t + β5Portsize i,j,t + β6SIC2 i,j,t + β7Top10 i,j,t    
+  β8All star i,j,t + β9Lag recommendation i,j,t + β10Size j,t + β11Log(Trading Volume) j,t + β12 Institutional 
Holding j,t + β13BM j,t + β14Past Ret j,t + β15No. of Analysts j,t + Year FE + ε i,j,t     (3) 
 
The dependent variable is the cumulative 3-day market-adjusted abnormal stock return around a 
stock recommendation revision. The key explanatory variables are the High and Low indicators which 
capture the relative importance of a firm in an analyst’s portfolio.  We control for year fixed effects and 
adjust standard errors for clustering at the firm and analyst level. Following prior literature (e.g., Kecskes, 
Michaely, and Womack (2016)), we run separate regressions on recommendation upgrades and 
downgrades because of the asymmetric market reactions they elicit. Specifically, investors consider 
downgrades more credible and informative than upgrades, because the latter may be driven by analysts’ 
conflicts of interest, namely, their incentive to please firm management and drum up order flow. 
 Panel A of Table 6 presents results for downgrades. Columns (1) to (3) correspond to the three 
different ways of ranking the relative importance of firms within an analyst’s portfolio. We find that 
market reactions are stronger (weaker) for downgrades issued by analysts on their relatively more (less) 
important firms. In all specifications, the coefficients on High (Low) are significantly negative (positive) 
at the 1% level.  In terms of economic significance, the coefficients in column (1) suggest that market 
reactions to downgrades are 54.8 basis points stronger for firms ranked relatively high in an analyst’s 
portfolio and 33.3 basis points weaker for firms ranked relatively low in an analyst’s portfolio. These 
results indicate that the informativeness of stock recommendations is related to a firm’s ranking within an 
analyst’s portfolio. 
Panel B of Table 6 presents results for upgrades. The coefficients on High are significantly 
positive in all specifications, and the coefficients on Low are negative in all specifications but significant 
only in column (2). As a gauge of economic significance, the coefficients in column (1) indicate that 
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stock market reactions are 15.2 basis points higher for firms with relatively high rankings, and 13.1 basis 
points lower for firms with relatively low rankings. The relatively weaker statistical and economic 
significance of the results for upgrades are likely due to their generally lower information content 
compared to downgrades.    
 
5. The real effects of analyst career concerns on firm information environment 
The results from Section 4 are consistent with analysts devoting more effort to information 
production for relatively more important firms in their portfolios. A direct implication of our evidence is 
that everything else being equal, firms that on average are ranked high in relative importance across their 
analysts’ portfolios should have more transparent information environments. In this section, we test this 
conjecture by examining the effects of analyst effort allocation on firms’ information asymmetry and 
costs of equity capital. 
Different from the previous section, where we conduct tests at the analyst-firm-year level, the 
analysis in this section is at the firm-year level. We construct two variables to capture a firm’s average 
relative ranking across all of its analysts. Specifically, we define %High (%Low) as the proportion of a 
firm’s analysts who rank the firm high (low) in their portfolios. A higher value of %High implies that 
collectively more analyst effort is allocated to the firm while a higher value of %Low implies that 
collectively less analyst effort is allocated to the firm. Therefore, we expect a firm’s information 
asymmetry and costs of capital to decrease with %High and increase with %Low. Appendix C reports the 
summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in this section. Panels A and B are 
based on two different samples, one for the information asymmetry analysis and the other for the costs of 
capital analysis. 
 
5.1. Information asymmetry: Bid-ask spread and stock market liquidity 
We follow the literature to measure a firm’s information asymmetry in two ways.  First, we 
compute a stock’s bid-ask spread as a percentage of the stock price. A lower bid-ask spread implies lower 
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information asymmetry. Second, we compute the Amihud (2002) stock illiquidity measure, which is 
defined as the natural log of one plus the ratio of the absolute stock return to the dollar trading volume 
and scaled by 1,000,000.13 The key independent variables are %High and %Low. We control for a wide 
array of variables that have been shown to affect firms’ information asymmetry. In particular, we control 
for firm size, trading volume, and institutional holding and their quadratic forms to ensure that %High 
and %Low are not simply picking up the effects of these firm characteristics. Our regression model is 
specified as follows. 
 
     Bid-ask spread or Amihud illiquidity measure  
= β0 + β1%High + β2%Low + β3No. of Analysts + β4Size + β5Size2 + β6Log(Trading Volume)  
+ β7Log(Trading Volume) 2 + β8 Institutional Holding + β9 Institutional Holding2 + β10Log(Stock Price) 
+ β11BM + β12Leverage + β13Past Ret + β14ROA + β15Volatility + Year FE + Firm FE + ε                     (4) 
 
Panel A of Table 7 presents the results from the bid-ask spread regressions. Consistent with our 
conjecture, the coefficients on %High are significantly negative in all three specifications and the 
coefficients on %Low are significantly positive in two specifications.  These results indicate that a firm 
which is ranked high by a larger proportion of its analysts has lower information asymmetry as measured 
by the bid-ask spreads. Economically, the coefficient estimates in column (1) suggest that, for a one 
standard deviation increase in %High, a firm’s bid-ask spread on average decreases by 2.86 basis points 
(= -0.118×0.242×100) or 2.40% (=2.86/119).14 Similarly, for a one standard deviation increase in %Low, 
a firm’s bid-ask spread increases by 1.40 (=0.039×0.359×100) basis points or 1.17% (=1.40/119). As a 
comparison, for a one standard deviation increase in No. of Analysts, a firm’s bid-ask spread on average 
                                                            
13 Following prior literature, we exclude firms with stock prices below $5.  
14 The standard deviation of %High (%Low) in our sample is 0.242 (0.359). The mean value of bid-ask spread in our 
sample is 119 basis points. Please see Panel A of Appendix C.  
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decreases by 1.97 basis points (=-0.003×6.557×100) or 1.66% (=1.97/119).15 Therefore, the economic 
significance of %High and %Low is on par with that of No. of Analysts.     
Coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with the literature. For example, the bid-
ask spread decreases with the number of analysts covering a firm, firm size, trading volume, stock return, 
and increases with stock volatility.  
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results from the regressions of the Amihud illiquidity measure. 
We find that firms covered by more analysts who rank them high (low) enjoy higher (lower) stock market 
liquidity. Our results in Table 7 are robust to an alternative specification in which we replace %High 
(or %Low) with a dummy variable equal to one if a majority of a firm’s analysts rank the firm high (or 
low) in their portfolios.       
 
5.2. Costs of equity capital 
To examine the effect of analyst effort allocation on firms’ costs of equity capital, we use the 
residual income valuation model developed by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) to estimate the 
implied cost of capital (ICOC). The basic premise of the residual income model is that the ICOC is the 
internal rate of return that equates the current stock price to the present value of the expected future 
sequence of residual incomes or abnormal earnings. As in equation (5), the key explanatory variables 
are %High and %Low and we control for the raw values of firm size, trading volume, and institutional 
holding and their quadratic forms. The other control variables are from Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 
(2001). The regression model is specified as follows: 
 
ICOC = β0 + β1%High + β2%Low + β3No of Analysts + β4Size + β5Size2 + β6Log(Trading Volume)  
+ β7Log(Trading Volume) 2 + β8 Institutional Holding + β9 Institutional Holding2 + β10MAE of forecasts 
+ β11Earnings variability + β12Dispersion of analyst forecasts + β13BM + β14Leverage + β15Past Ret  
+ β16Long-term growth + β17Beta + β18Volatility + Year FE + Firm FE + ε                                          (5) 
                                                            
15 The standard deviation of No. of Analysts in our sample is 6.557.  
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Table 8 presents the regression results. We find that a firm’s ICOC decreases with the percentage 
of analysts that rank the firm high in their portfolios and increases with the percentage of analysts that 
rank the firm low in their portfolios. The coefficients on %High are all significantly negative and the 
coefficients on %Low are positive and significant in two out of three specifications. Economically, the 
coefficient estimates in column (1) suggest that, for a one standard deviation increase in %High or %Low, 
a firm’s implied cost of capital on average decreases by 1.08% (=-0.259×0.274/(0.0654×100)) or 
increases by 0.89% (=0.193×0.303/(0.0654×100)). 16  As a comparison, for a one standard deviation 
increase in No. of Analysts, a firm’s implied cost of capital on average decreases by 0.99% (=-
0.009×7.158/ (0.0654×100)). Therefore, the economic impact of %High and %Low is similar to that of 
No. of Analysts.   
Overall, our analysis in this section shows that a firm that is considered relatively more important 
by a larger proportion of its analysts has lower information asymmetry, better stock market liquidity, and 
a lower cost of capital.  These results are consistent with analysts producing more information for 
relatively more career-important firms in their portfolios, and suggest that when evaluating the impact of 
analyst coverage on a firm’s information environment, it is important to consider not only the number of 
analysts providing coverage but also the firm’s average relative importance in the analysts’ portfolios. 
 
5.3. The effects of exogenous losses of analyst coverage 
For a sharper identification of the effects of analyst effort allocation on firm information 
environments, we exploit exogenous losses of analyst coverage due to brokerage house closures and 
mergers as a quasi-natural experiment. Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) document that information 
asymmetry increases following analyst coverage termination caused by brokerage house closures and 
mergers. We examine if the effect is stronger (or weaker) for firms losing coverage by an analyst who 
ranks the firm high (or low).  
                                                            
16 The mean implied cost of capital for our sample firms is 0.0654. Please see Panel B of Appendix C.  
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There are 38 brokerage house closures and mergers during our sample period.17 We first identify 
firms that experienced losses of analyst coverage caused by brokerage closures or mergers. For broker 
mergers, we focus only on analyst coverage terminations where a stock was covered by an analyst from 
both the acquirer and target brokers before the merger, and by only one surviving analyst after the merger 
(e.g., Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) and Derrien and Kecskes (2013)). To remove the common factors that 
affect the information environment of similar firms at the same time, we follow Kelly and Ljungqvist 
(2012) and Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (DGTW, 1997) to construct a control group for each 
treatment firm. Specifically, for each firm experiencing analyst coverage losses, a control group is formed 
by selecting stocks with the same size and book-to-market quintile assignment in the month of June prior 
to the analyst loss, subject to the conditions that control firms (1) were covered by one or more analysts in 
the three months before the event; and (2) were not themselves subject to a coverage termination in the 
quarter before and after the event. We select up to five control stocks that are closest to the treatment 
stock in terms of the relevant pre-event information asymmetry measure. We then employ a difference-in-
differences (DiD) approach to compare the change in the information environment of control firms to 
treatment firms. We further split the treatment firms into High and Low groups based on each treatment 
firm’s ranking (high or low) in the lost analyst’s portfolio in the year before the brokerage house closures 
and mergers. Based on market capitalization, we have 463 treatment firms in the High group and 214 
treatment firms in the Low group. 
Table 9 reports the differences in the mean DiD between the High and Low groups for the bid-ask 
spread and Amihud illiquidity measures. Following Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012), we compute the 
changes in a firm’s bid-ask spread and stock illiquidity from three (or six) months before an analyst 
coverage loss to three (or six) months afterwards. Specifically, we calculate the average bid-ask spread 
and stock illiquidity using daily stock price and returns data over a three- (or six-) month estimation 
window ending ten days before a termination event and a three- (or six-) month estimation window 
starting ten days after the termination event.  
                                                            
17 Our sample of brokerage house mergers and closures comes from Wang, Xie, and Zhang (2016).   
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Results in Panel A show that the differences in the mean DiD between the High and Low groups 
of treatment firms are positive and statistically significant in all cases. This suggests that firms losing 
coverage from an analyst who ranks them high experience significantly larger increases in bid-ask spreads 
compared to firms losing coverage from an analyst who ranks them low. In Panel B, firms in the High 
group also experience larger increases in the Amihud illiquidity measure due to analyst coverage losses, 
and the differences in the mean DiD between the High and Low groups are statistically significant when 
firms are ranked by market capitalization and institutional ownership. Overall, results in this section 
provide further support for our conjecture that analysts devote more effort to information production for 
relatively more important firms in their portfolios, helping to create more transparent information 
environments for these firms.18 
 
6. Strategic effort allocation and analyst career outcomes 
 The evidence presented so far in the paper suggests that analysts respond to career concern 
incentives in strategically allocating their effort among portfolio firms. A question that naturally arises 
from our finding is whether the extent of analysts’ strategic effort allocation has any impact on their 
career outcomes. Specifically, if an analyst indeed devotes more effort to, and produces higher-quality 
research for, firms with greater visibility, more institutional following, and greater brokerage commission 
potential, we expect the analyst to experience more favorable career outcomes. We test this conjecture by 
examining two measurable career outcomes – being voted an “All Star,” and moving up to a more 
prestigious brokerage firm. We expect that a higher degree of career concern-based effort allocation 
increases the likelihood of both outcomes.    
We capture the extent of such effort allocation by the difference in forecast frequency and 
accuracy between the High and Low groups of firms in an analyst’s portfolio. The rationale behind this 
                                                            
18 The identification strategy used in this section is less well suited for the implied cost of capital measure, because 
its estimation is based on many inputs that are unlikely to change much over our short event windows, such as the 
historical dividend yield, expected earnings per share, and the long-term GDP growth rate. 
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approach is that in the absence of strategic effort allocation we should not expect to observe any 
difference in the relative frequency and accuracy of forecasts issued by the same analyst to firms in her 
portfolio. This is because an analyst’s forecast behavior for each firm is measured relative to other 
analysts covering the same firm in the same year, effectively removing firm-year effects from our forecast 
frequency and accuracy measures. Therefore, analyst effort allocation is the only logical explanation for 
any observed difference in these measures between the high and low groups of firms within an analyst’s 
portfolio. 
We estimate a logit regression to investigate how strategic effort allocation affects the probability 
of an analyst being voted an “All Star”. We extract the annual list of “All Star” analysts from the October 
issues of Institutional Investor magazine. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if an analyst is named an “All Star” in a particular year and zero otherwise. The key independent variables 
are the differences in relative forecast frequency and accuracy between the high and low groups within 
each analyst’s portfolio. We include the analyst’s general forecasting experience, portfolio size, number 
of industries covered, average forecast frequency and accuracy for portfolio firms, average portfolio firm 
size, as well as whether the analyst was an “All Star” in the previous year. Our model is specified as 
follows. 
 
Pr(Voted All-star)  = β0 + β1(Diff(High-Low) in DFREQ) + β2(Diff(High-Low) in PMAFE) + β3GExp + 
β4Portsize + β5SIC2 + β6Brokerage Size + β7Average PMAFE + β8Average DFREQ + β9Average Firm 
Size + β10lag(All star) + Year FE + ε                                                                                                (6) 
Panel A of Table 10 presents the regression results. For each specification, we have separate 
regressions using market capitalization, trading volume, and institutional ownership to define the high vs. 
low groups. We find that in all model specifications, the high-low group difference in relative forecast 
frequency has a significant and positive coefficient and the high-low group difference in relative forecast 
errors has a significant and negative coefficient. Note that for analysts who strategically allocate their 
efforts, we expect a positive difference in the relative forecast frequency and a negative difference in 
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forecast errors between high and low groups.  Thus, our results suggest that analysts who engage in a 
greater extent of strategic effort allocation are more likely to be voted “All Star”. This is consistent with 
our earlier conjecture and provides a rational justification for the analyst effort allocation pattern we 
observe in the data.  
With respect to the control variables, their coefficients are largely in line with extant evidence in 
the literature. For example, analysts who cover larger portfolios with larger firms, work for larger 
brokerage firms, issue more frequent and more accurate earnings forecasts for average portfolio firms are 
more likely to be voted “All Stars”. There is also significant evidence of persistence in analysts being 
named “All Star” in consecutive years.19   
Next, we investigate the effect of strategic effort allocation on the likelihood of an analyst being 
promoted. Following Hong and Kubik (2003), we define analyst promotion as cases in which an analyst 
moves from a low-status brokerage house to a high-status one. Each year we classify the top ten 
brokerage houses employing the most analysts as high-status and the rest as low-status.20 We find that 
during our sample period, 9.77% of the analysts switch brokerage houses each year. Of those analysts that 
switch employers, 14.29% of them move from a low-status brokerage house to a high-status one, a 
frequency that is comparable to that reported by Hong and Kubik (2003). Following Hong and Kubik 
(2003), we measure analyst performance over a 3-year period. Therefore, in the regression model 
specified below, Diff(High-Low) in DFREQ, Diff(High-Low) in PMAFE, Average DFREQ, and Average 
PMAFE are calculated as the averages over the previous 3 years.  
 
Pr(Being Promoted) = β0 + β1(Diff(High-Low) in DFREQ) + β2(Diff(High-Low) in PMAFE) + β3GExp   
                                    + β4Portsize + β5SIC2 + β6Brokerage Size + β7Average PMAFE  
                                    + β8Average DFREQ + β9Average Firm Size + Year FE + ε              (8) 
                                                            
19 We also examine the probability of an analyst being a first-time all-star and obtain qualitatively similar results. 
The probability of an analyst being a first-time all-star in our sample is 1.85%. 
20 We also make sure that an analyst’s promotion is not driven by a brokerage house’s status change. That is, we 
require that the analyst’s former employer is a low-status brokerage house in both year t and year t+1, and her new 




Panel B of Table 10 reports the regression results.21 Similar to the results in Panel A, the high-low 
group difference in relative forecast frequency has a significant and positive coefficient and the high-low 
group difference in relative forecast errors has a significant and negative coefficient in two out of three 
specifications. These results suggest that analysts who engage in a greater extent of strategic effort 
allocation are more likely to move up to more prestigious brokerage houses. 
 
7. Additional Analysis 
7.1. Heterogeneity among firms within an analyst’s portfolio 
Some analyst portfolios are characterized by large differences between their high and low firms, 
while other analysts cover relatively similar firms, so that there is not as much of a difference, and hence 
less incentive for strategic effort allocation. The idea is that in analyst portfolios with large variations in 
market capitalization, trading volume, or institutional ownership, the high and low designations are likely 
to be more meaningful indicators of firms’ relative importance to analyst career concerns and thus more 
powerful predictors of analyst effort allocation. To test this conjecture, we first compute the standard 
deviation of market capitalization, trading volume, and institutional ownership for each analyst portfolio 
in each year and partition our sample into subsamples based on whether the within-portfolio variation 
along a particular dimension is above or below the sample median. We then repeat our analysis in Section 
4 in these subsamples. In untabulated results, we find that analysts covering portfolios with larger 
variations in market capitalization, trading volume, or institutional ownership indeed engage in a greater 
extent of strategic effort allocation.  
                                                            
21 The sample used for the promotion analysis is smaller because this test is conditional on an analyst working at a 
low-status brokerage house in the base year t and we require each analyst to have at least three years of earnings 




7.2. Alternative measure for analyst forecast accuracy 
We repeat the analyst forecast accuracy analysis using an alternative measure of forecast 
accuracy suggested by Clement and Tse (2005), which is defined as follows. 
ܣܿܿݑݎܽܿݕ௜ 	ൌ MaxሺAFEሻ 	െ 	AFE௜MaxሺAFEሻ 	െ 	MinሺAFEሻ 
This alternative proxy increases with forecast accuracy, while PMAFE decreases with forecast accuracy. 
In untabulated results, we continue to find that analysts issue more (less) accurate forecasts for firms that 
are relatively more (less) important within their portfolios.    
 
7.3. Coverage termination 
We examine analysts’ decision to terminate coverage on a firm as another indicator of effort 
allocation. Our career concerns hypothesis predicts that analysts are less (more) likely to stop providing 
research coverage for firms that are relatively more (less) important in their portfolios. We define 
coverage termination as instances in which an analyst does not issue earnings forecasts for a firm for an 
entire year but she did so in the previous year. In our sample, the unconditional probability of a firm being 
dropped by an analyst is 15.3%, and the likelihood decreases to 12.9% if the analyst ranks the firm high 
and increases to 19.5% if the analyst ranks the firm low. For more reliable inferences, we estimate a 
logistic regression where the dependent variable is equal to one if a firm loses coverage by an analyst in a 
given year and the key explanatory variables are the High and Low indicators reflecting a firm’s relative 
importance in the analyst’s portfolio. We control for firm and analyst characteristics included in previous 
tables, the analyst’s prior forecast accuracy for the firm, and analyst-firm pair fixed effects. Untabulated 
results show that an analyst is more likely to stop coverage for a firm that is ranked low in her research 
portfolio, and this is especially the case when her prior forecast accuracy is poor for the firm. These 





We provide evidence on how financial analysts treat firms in their portfolios differently and the 
implications this has for the information environment of the firms they follow. Analysts devote more 
effort to researching firms that are more important for their career concerns. Specifically, within each 
analyst’s portfolio, firms ranked relatively higher based on market capitalization, trading volume, or 
institutional ownership receive more frequent earnings forecast revisions and more accurate earnings 
forecasts. These findings are robust to controlling for firm and analyst characteristics and the inclusion of 
firm fixed effects, analyst fixed effects, and, importantly, analyst-firm pair fixed effects. Earnings forecast 
revisions and stock recommendation changes issued by analysts for the relatively more important firms in 
their portfolios also generate significantly stronger stock price reactions. This pattern of analysts 
strategically allocating their effort among portfolio firms is especially strong when they have larger 
research portfolios.  
Analysts’ career concern-based effort allocation also carries real consequences for firms. 
Specifically, firms covered by more analysts who rank them as more important in their portfolios have, on 
average, more transparent information environments, characterized by lower bid-ask spreads, stock 
market illiquidity, and costs of equity capital. Thus, the information environment of a firm is determined 
in part by what other firms its analysts cover. The marginal impact of a new analyst on a firm’s spreads, 
liquidity and cost of capital varies with the firm’s relative rank within the new analyst’s portfolio. 
Researchers studying the impact of analysts on firms should take into account these analyst portfolio 
effects. 
Finally, as a logical justification for the observed effort allocation pattern, we find that analysts 
who engage in a greater extent of strategic effort allocation are more likely to be voted “All Stars” by 
institutional investors and move up to more prestigious brokerage houses. Overall, our entire body of 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that driven by career concerns, analysts strategically allocate 
their effort among firms in their portfolios, which is reflected in the frequency, accuracy, and 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition  
%High The percentage of a firm’s analysts who rank the firm high in their portfolios in year 
t.  
%Low The percentage of a firm’s analysts who rank the firm low in their portfolios in year t. 
AFE The absolute forecast error of analyst i for firm j, calculated as the absolute value of 
the difference between analyst i’s earnings forecast for firm j and the actual earnings 
reported by firm j 
Age  The age of analyst i’s forecast (Age) is defined as the number of days between analyst 
i’s forecast for firm j and the firm’s fiscal year end.  
 
All-star Indicator variable is one if the analyst is named to Institutional Investor’s all-star 
team in current year, and zero otherwise. 
Amihud illiquidity The natural log of one plus the ratio of the absolute stock return to the dollar trading 
volume and scaled by 106. 
Average DFREQ The average DFREQ of all the firms covered by analyst i in year t-1. 
Average PMAFE The average PMAFE of all the firms covered by analyst i in year t-1. 
Average firm size The average size of the all the firms covered by analyst i in year t-1. 
Beta Market beta of a firm based on a five-year rolling regression using monthly data and 
the value-weighted CRSP index. 
Bid-ask spread Computed as 100 * (ask–bid) / [(ask+bid) / 2] using daily closing bid and ask prices 
from CRSP 
BM Book value of equity in the fiscal year prior to the earnings forecast divided by the 
current market value of equity. 
Brokerage size The total number of analysts working at a given analyst i’s brokerage house. 
CAR Three-day CRSP value-weighted market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return. 
Values are multiplied by 100. 
DAge  The age of analyst i’s  forecast (Age) minus the average age of forecasts issued by 
analysts following firm j at year t, where age is defined as the age of forecasts in days 




DFExp  The total number of years since analyst i’s first earnings forecast for firm j (FExp) 
minus the average number of years I/B/E/S analysts supplying earnings forecasts for 
firm j in year t.  
DFREQ The number of earnings forecast revisions issued by analyst i for firm j in year t, 
minus the average number of earnings forecast revisions issued by all analysts for 
firm j in year t.  
DGExp  The total number of years that analyst i’s appeared in I/B/E/S (GExp) minus the 
average tenure of analysts supplying earnings forecasts for firm j in year t.  
Diff(High-Low) 
in DFREQ 
The average DFREQ of firms in the high group of an analyst’s portfolio minus the 
average DFREQ of firms in the low group of the analyst’s portfolio in year t-1.  
Diff(High-Low) 
in PMAFE 
The average PMAFE of firms in the high group of an analyst’s portfolio minus the 
average PMAFE of firms in the low group of the analyst’s portfolio in year t-1. 
Dispersion of 
analyst forecasts 
The coefficient of variation of the current FY1 forecast. 
DPortsize The number of firms followed by analyst i for firm j in year t (Portsize) minus the 
average number of firms followed by analysts supplying earnings forecasts for firm j 
in year t. 
DSIC2 Number of 2 digit SICs followed by analyst i in year t (SIC2) minus the average 
number of 2-digit SICs followed by analysts following firm j in year t. 
DTop10 Indicator variable is one if analyst works at a top decile brokerage house (Top10) 
minus the mean value of top decile brokerage house indicators for analysts following 
firm j in year t. 
Earnings 
variability  
The coefficient of the variation of annual earnings over the previous five years. 
FExp  The total number of years since analyst i’s first earnings forecast for firm j in year t.  
FREQ The number of earnings forecast revisions issued by analyst i for firm j in year t.  
FR  Analyst forecast revision following Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004). The difference 
between an analyst’s revised forecast and the previous forecast scaled by the absolute 
value of the previous forecast. The denominator is set equal to .01 if the absolute 
value of the previous forecast is smaller. Values are multiplied by 100 and are 
truncated between -50% and 50%.  
 
GExp  The total number of years that analyst i’s appeared in I/B/E/S in year t.  
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High A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s market capitalization (or 
trading volume, institutional ownership) is in the top quartile of all firms the analyst 




The percentage of a firm’s equity held by all institutions at the end of year t-1.  
Institutional 
ownership 
The dollar amount of institutional investment in firm j, calculated as firm j’s market 
capitalization at the end of year t-1 multiplied by the percentage of equity held by all 
institutions. 
Leverage Long term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided total assets 
Long-term growth Long-term growth in earnings; the mean long-term earnings growth rate from 
I/B/E/S. 
Low A dummy variable which is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s market 
capitalization (or trading volume, institutional ownership) is in the lower quartile of 
all firms the analyst covers in that year, zero otherwise.   
 
MAE of forecasts  The average mean absolute error of the last five annual I/B/E/S consensus forecasts 
No. of analysts The number of unique analysts issuing earnings forecasts for firm j in year t. 
Past Ret CRSP VW-index adjusted buy-and hold abnormal returns over six months prior to 
the announcement date of the earnings forecast. 
PMAFE  The proportional mean absolute forecast error calculated as the difference between 
the absolute forecast error (AFE) for analyst i on firm j in year t and the mean 
absolute forecast error (MAFE) for firm j in year t scaled by the mean absolute 
forecast error for firm j in year t.  
 
Portsize The number of firms followed by analyst i in year t.  
ROA Return on assets, calculated as net income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations divided by total assets 
SIC2 The number of 2-digit SICs represented by firms followed by analyst i in year t. 
Size The natural log of market capitalization of the covered firm (in $thousands) at the end 
of year t-1. 
Top10 Indicator variable that is equal to one if an analyst works at a top decile brokerage 
house in year t. 
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Trading volume The annual trading volume (in thousand shares) for a firm j in year t-1 





Appendix B: Earnings Forecast Update Frequency 
 
This table presents OLS regression results for analyst earnings forecast update frequency for the full sample. The 
dependent variable is the de-meaned analyst forecast update frequency (DFREQ) in all regressions. The primary 
variables of interest are High and Low. High is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s market 
capitalization (or trading volume, institutional ownership) is in the top quartile of all firms the analyst covers in that 
year, zero otherwise. Low is a dummy variable which is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s market 
capitalization (or trading volume, institutional ownership) is in the lower quartile of all firms the analyst covers in 
that year, zero otherwise. See Appendix A for a description of control variables. t-statistics are in parentheses with 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm and analyst level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 
           
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
High 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
  (4.75) (3.96) (4.04) 
Low -0.058*** -0.041*** -0.054*** 
  (9.46) (7.62) (9.30) 
DGExp -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
  (5.54) (5.58) (5.55) 
DFExp 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 
  (32.61) (32.66) (32.60) 
DAge -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
  (95.52) (95.52) (95.54) 
DPortsize 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
  (3.78) (3.73) (3.76) 
DSIC2 -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
  (9.36) (9.32) (9.34) 
DTop10 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.169*** 
  (8.21) (8.13) (8.20) 
All-star 0.232*** 0.233*** 0.232*** 
  (8.68) (8.70) (8.70) 
        
# of observations 529,896 529,896 529,896 
R2 0.236 0.236 0.236 




Appendix C:  Summary Statistics for Variables in the Information Environment Analysis  
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in information environment analysis. Panel A reports the 
summary statistics of 64,011 firm-year observations in Table 7 and Panel B report the summary statistics of 34,219 
firm-year observations in Table 8. 
Panel A: Summary statistics for Table 7         
Variables Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std 
Bid-ask spread 1.194 0.128 0.768 1.814 1.370 
Amihud illiquidity 0.100 0.001 0.007 0.046 0.290 
% high (market cap) 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.182 0.242 
% low (market cap) 0.325 0.000 0.200 0.556 0.359 
% high (trading volume) 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.238 
% low (trading volume) 0.346 0.000 0.222 0.625 0.368 
% high (ownership) 0.129 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.235 
% low (ownership) 0.321 0.000 0.200 0.500 0.356 
No. of Analysts 7.704 3.000 6.000 10.000 6.557 
Size 13.701 12.490 13.547 14.773 1.635 
Log(trading volume) 11.766 10.506 11.732 12.948 1.770 
Institutional holding 0.530 0.329 0.541 0.734 0.251 
BM 0.689 0.480 0.713 0.911 0.269 
Leverage 0.223 0.054 0.196 0.343 0.192 
Price 27.426 13.200 22.726 36.088 19.033 
Past Ret 0.177 -0.112 0.115 0.381 0.521 
ROA 0.038 0.011 0.042 0.084 0.106 
Volatility 0.027 0.018 0.024 0.034 0.013 




Appendix C, Panel B: Summary statistics for Table 8 
  
Variables Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std 
Implied cost of capital 0.065 0.044 0.066 0.085 0.031 
% high (market cap) 0.189 0.000 0.000 0.286 0.274 
% low (market cap) 0.233 0.000 0.100 0.375 0.303 
% high (trading volume) 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.263 0.271 
% low (trading volume) 0.254 0.000 0.111 0.429 0.316 
% high (ownership) 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.286 0.267 
% low (ownership) 0.223 0.000 0.091 0.333 0.294 
No. of Analysts 10.005 5.000 8.000 14.000 7.158 
Size 14.343 13.197 14.252 15.390 1.571 
Log(trading volume) 12.360 11.178 12.348 13.505 1.696 
Institutional holding 0.605 0.444 0.628 0.786 0.225 
MAE of forecasts 0.107 0.028 0.061 0.140 0.320 
Earnings variability 0.390 0.170 0.279 0.504 0.931 
Dispersion of analyst forecasts 0.166 0.036 0.080 0.183 0.246 
BM 0.683 0.485 0.704 0.894 0.253 
Leverage 0.225 0.078 0.211 0.340 0.173 
Past Ret 0.171 -0.094 0.113 0.348 0.442 
Long-term growth (%) 14.484 9.682 13.000 17.800 8.237 
Beta 1.086 0.631 1.003 1.410 0.647 
Volatility 0.025 0.016 0.022 0.031 0.012 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of analyst characteristics of our main variables used throughout this paper. 
Earnings forecast accuracy (PMAFE) is defined as the difference between the absolute forecast error for analyst i for 
firm j and the mean absolute forecast error at year t scaled by the mean absolute forecast error for firm j at year t. 
See Appendix A for a description of control variables. Analyst data are from I/B/E/S from 1983 to 2012, stock price 
data are from CRSP, and firm characteristics are obtained from Compustat. In Panel C, the notation *** indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics         
Variables Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std 
AFE 0.25 0.02 0.07 0.21 0.60 
FREQ 3.59 2 3 5 2.38 
AGE 114.70 60 73 154 83.39 
GEXP 5.05 2 4 7 4.37 
FEXP 3.20 1 2 4 2.68 
PORTSIZE 17.01 10 14 20 13.49 
SIC2 4.17 2 3 5 3.13 
TOP10 0.49 0 0 1 0.50 
 
 
Panel B: De-meaned summary statistics 
      
Variables Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std 
PMAFE 0 -0.57 -0.15 0.24 0.86 
DFREQ 0 -1.05 0.00 1.00 1.75 
DAGE 0 -45.81 -17.67 26.25 72.81 
DGEXP 0 -2.42 -0.33 1.88 3.62 
DFEXP 0 -1.27 -0.21 0.84 2.16 
DPORTSIZE 0 -5.00 -0.97 3.27 8.93 
DSIC2 0 -1.19 -0.29 0.75 2.09 
DTOP10 0 -0.43 0.00 0.42 0.44 





Panel C: Comparison between firms in the high and low groups 
  Market Cap Trading Volume Institutional Ownership 
Variables High Low Diff High Low Diff High Low Diff 
FREQ 3.821 3.377 *** 3.876 3.337 *** 3.787 3.315 *** 
DFREQ 0.005 -0.046 *** 0.003 -0.031 *** 0.008 -0.041 *** 
AFE 0.225 0.293 *** 0.243 0.260 *** 0.231 0.285 *** 
PMAFE -0.026 0.009 *** -0.026 0.012 *** -0.026 0.010 *** 
Log(market cap) 16.231 12.933 *** 15.873 13.304 *** 16.225 13.010 *** 
Log(trading volume) 13.932 11.683 *** 14.216 11.298 *** 13.900 11.621 *** 




Table 2: Analyst Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
 
This table presents OLS regression results for analyst earnings forecast accuracy for the full sample. The dependent 
variable is the proportional mean absolute forecast error PMAFE (multiplied by 100). The primary variables of 
interest are High and Low. High is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s market capitalization 
(or trading volume, institutional ownership) is in the top quartile of all firms the analyst covers in that year, zero 
otherwise. Low is a dummy variable which is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s market capitalization 
(or trading volume, institutional ownership) is in the lower quartile of all firms the analyst covers in that year, zero 
otherwise. See Appendix A for a description of control variables. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm and analyst level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Panel B presents analyst fixed effect regression results, Panel C 
presents firm fixed effect regression results, and Panel D presents analyst-firm pair fixed effect regression results. 
 
 
Panel A: OLS regression results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
High -1.928*** -1.816*** -1.734*** 
  (6.91) (6.24) (6.35) 
Low 1.594*** 1.407*** 1.512*** 
  (5.73) (5.14) (5.33) 
DGExp -0.257*** -0.256*** -0.258*** 
  (3.38) (3.37) (3.39) 
DFExp -0.696*** -0.697*** -0.696*** 
  (7.67) (7.67) (7.66) 
DAge 0.519*** 0.519*** 0.519*** 
  (85.72) (85.70) (85.71) 
DPortsize 0.123** 0.122** 0.123** 
  (2.01) (1.99) (2.01) 
DSIC2 0.834*** 0.842*** 0.832*** 
  (5.89) (5.95) (5.87) 
DTop10 -2.622*** -2.605*** -2.620*** 
  (5.08) (5.05) (5.07) 
All-star -4.361*** -4.271*** -4.275*** 
  (8.05) (7.89) (7.96) 
        
# of observations 529,427 529,427 529,427 





   Panel B – Analyst fixed effect results    
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
High -1.566*** -1.540*** -1.446*** 
  (5.27) (5.22) (4.87) 
Low 1.302*** 1.329*** 1.420*** 
  (4.52) (4.78) (4.81) 
        
Controls (from Panel A) Y Y Y 
Analyst FE Y Y Y 
# of observations 529,427 529,427 529,427 
R2 0.234 0.234 0.234 
        
  
 
Panel C – Firm fixed effect results 
 
  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
High -2.535*** -2.576*** -2.220*** 
  (6.80) (6.92) (6.08) 
Low 2.028*** 2.155*** 1.928*** 
  (6.23) (6.44) (5.99) 
        
Controls (from Panel A) Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
# of observations 529,427 529,427 529,427 
R2 0.188 0.188 0.188 
           
 
Panel D – Analyst-firm pair fixed effect results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
High -2.151*** -1.579** -2.008*** 
  (3.13) (2.42) (3.03) 
Low 1.621** 1.303** 1.620*** 
  (2.49) (2.08) (2.58) 
        
Controls (from Panel A) Y Y Y 
Analyst-firm FE Y Y Y 
# of observations 529,427 529,427 529,427 





Table 3: Analyst Forecast Accuracy: Absolute Forecast Error 
 
The dependent variable is the absolute forecast error (AFE, multiplied by 100) rather than the proportional mean 
forecast error as in Table 2. The explanatory variables of interest are High and Low. High is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s market capitalization (or trading volume, institutional ownership) is in the 
top quartile of all firms the analyst covers in that year, zero otherwise. Low is a dummy variable which is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s market capitalization (or trading volume, institutional ownership) is in 
the lower quartile of all firms the analyst covers in that year, zero otherwise. See Appendix A for a description of 
control variables. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors clustered at the 
firm and analyst level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
        
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
High -0.229*** -0.272*** -0.226*** 
  (3.44) (3.87) (3.52) 
Low 0.342*** 0.369*** 0.315*** 
  (4.75) (5.19) (4.62) 
GExp -0.025** -0.025** -0.025** 
  (2.20) (2.18) (2.19) 
FExp -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.081*** 
  (6.11) (6.11) (6.12) 
Age 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 
  (53.98) (53.96) (53.97) 
Portsize 0.015 0.015 0.015 
  (1.26) (1.26) (1.27) 
SIC2 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 
  (2.96) (3.01) (2.94) 
Top10 -0.380*** -0.377*** -0.378*** 
  (5.14) (5.11) (5.11) 
All-star -0.674*** -0.675*** -0.672*** 
  (6.67) (6.68) (6.64) 
        
Firm-year FE Y Y Y 
# of observations 529,427 529,427 529,427 






Table 4: Busy Analysts vs. Non-busy Analysts 
 
This table presents results from OLS regressions of earnings forecast accuracy for “busy” and “non-busy” analysts, 
where “busy” analysts are defined as those whose portfolio size in a given year is greater than the sample median. 
The dependent variable is the proportional mean absolute forecast error (PMAFE) defined as the difference between 
the absolute forecast errors for analyst i for firm j and the mean absolute forecast error at year t scaled by the mean 
absolute forecast error for firm j at year t. High is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s market 
capitalization (or trading volume, institutional ownership) is in the top quartile of all firms the analyst covers in that 
year, zero otherwise. Low is a dummy variable which is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s market 
capitalization (or trading volume, institutional ownership) is in the lower quartile of all firms the analyst covers in 
that year, zero otherwise. See Appendix A for a description of control variables. In parentheses are t-statistics based 
on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm and analyst level. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: “Busy” analysts 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
High -2.395*** -2.365*** -2.158*** 
  (6.77) (6.81) (6.02) 
Low 2.277*** 2.129*** 2.215*** 
  (7.05) (6.84) (6.86) 
        
Controls (from Table 2) Y Y Y 
# of observations 349,933 349,933 349,933 
R-squared 0.163 0.163 0.163 
  
  
Panel B: “Non-busy” analysts 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
High -0.975** -0.683 -0.736 
  (2.06) (1.39) (1.60) 
Low 0.845* 0.884* 0.872* 
  (1.84) (1.91) (1.88) 
        
Controls (from Table 2) Y Y Y 
# of observations 179,494 179,494 179,494 
R-squared 0.227 0.227 0.227 






Table 5: Stock Market Reactions to Forecast Revision 
 
This table reports the market reaction to analysts’ revisions of earnings forecasts. The dependent variable is the 
cumulative 3-day market adjusted return (multiplied by 100) around the announcement of forecast revision by 
analyst i for firm j at year t. High is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s market capitalization 
(column (1), trading volume (2) or institutional ownership (3) is in the top quartile of all firms the analyst covers in 
that year, zero otherwise. Low is a dummy variable which is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s market 
capitalization, trading volume or institutional ownership is in the lower quartile of all firms the analyst covers in that 
year, zero otherwise. Forecast revision (FR) is the ratio of the difference between the new forecast and the old 
forecast to the absolute value of the old forecast. See Appendix A for a description of control variables. Analyst data 
are from I/B/E/S from 1983 to 2012, stock price data are from CRSP, and firm characteristics are obtained from 
Compustat. Year fixed effects are included. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent 
standard errors clustered at the firm level and analyst level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
High*FR 0.007* 0.006* 0.004 
  (1.89) (1.72) (1.01) 
Low*FR -0.008*** -0.006** -0.010*** 
  (2.77) (2.04) (3.47) 
FR 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 
  (31.68) (31.78) (32.58) 
High 0.049 0.011 0.028 
  (1.37) (0.27) (0.75) 
Low -0.072 -0.058 -0.061 
  (1.61) (1.47) (1.48) 
        
Controls from Table 2 Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.150 0.150 0.150 





Table 6: Stock Market Reactions to Recommendation Updates 
 
This table reports the market reaction to analysts’ recommendation updates. The dependent variable is the 
cumulative 3-day market adjusted return (multiplied by 100) around the announcement of recommendation update 
by analyst i for firm j at year t. High is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s market 
capitalization (column (1), trading volume (2), or institutional ownership (3) is in the top quartile of all firms the 
analyst covers in that year, zero otherwise. Low is a dummy variable which is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm’s market capitalization, trading volume or institutional ownership is in the lower quartile of all firms the 
analyst covers in that year, zero otherwise. Panel A reports analysis for recommendation downgrade and Panel B 
reports analysis for recommendation upgrade. Year fixed effects are included. See Appendix A for a description of 
control variables. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors clustered at the 
firm and analyst level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Downgrades 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
High -0.548*** -0.501*** -0.583*** 
  (5.76) (5.21) (5.87) 
Low 0.333*** 0.324*** 0.372*** 
  (3.08) (3.02) (3.35) 
Gexp -0.036** -0.033** -0.037*** 
  (2.58) (2.30) (2.62) 
Fexp 0.066*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 
  (4.19) (3.88) (4.19) 
Portsize 0.009 0.009 0.009 
  (1.28) (1.36) (1.34) 
SIC2 0.082*** 0.073*** 0.079*** 
  (3.99) (3.59) (3.89) 
Top10 -0.859*** -0.809*** -0.871*** 
  (8.88) (8.28) (9.03) 
All-star -0.341** -0.281* -0.345*** 
  (2.32) (1.93) (2.36) 
Lag recommendation -0.145*** -0.121** -0.146*** 
  (2.67) (2.23) (2.70) 
Size 1.532*** 1.433*** 1.526*** 
  (27.88) (28.67) (27.97) 
Log(trading volume) -0.902*** -0.966*** -0.905*** 
  (18.13) (17.00) (18.18) 
Institutional holding -0.543*** -0.521** -0.319 
  (2.64) (2.53) (1.51) 
BM 2.052*** 2.096*** 2.062*** 
  (13.36) (13.53) (13.41) 
Past Ret 3.943*** 3.956*** 3.943*** 
  (21.92) (21.99) (21.96) 
No. of Analysts 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
  (3.15) (3.23) (3.20) 
        
Year FE Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.0889 0.0885 0.0891 
# of observations 75,552 75,552 75,552 




Panel B: Upgrades 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
High 0.152** 0.174** 0.167** 
  (2.13) (2.38) (2.27) 
Low -0.131 -0.162* -0.105 
  (1.52) (1.85) (1.16) 
Gexp 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 
  (2.26) (2.22) (2.28) 
Fexp -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
  (1.41) (1.37) (1.42) 
Portsize -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
  (3.99) (3.91) (4.00) 
SIC2 -0.015 -0.013 -0.016 
  (1.01) (0.89) (1.03) 
Top10 0.828*** 0.823*** 0.832*** 
  (11.65) (11.63) (11.72) 
All-star 0.601*** 0.592*** 0.604*** 
  (5.75) (5.67) (5.78) 
Lag recommendation -0.335*** -0.337*** -0.332*** 
  (7.81) (7.91) (7.78) 
Size -0.794*** -0.792*** -0.802*** 
  (20.92) (22.89) (21.67) 
Log(trading volume) 0.373*** 0.398*** 0.373*** 
  (9.74) (9.21) (9.72) 
Institutional holding -0.062 -0.085 -0.067 
  (0.36) (0.49) (0.38) 
BM -0.244** -0.231** -0.237** 
  (2.38) (2.24) (2.30) 
Past Ret 2.231*** 2.229*** 2.234*** 
  (16.08) (16.06) (16.10) 
No. of Analysts -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
  (2.98) (3.01) (2.96) 
        
Year FE Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.0546 0.0546 0.0546 







Table 7: Bid-ask spread and stock illiquidity 
 
This table reports the analysis of the impact of analysts’ effort allocation on a firm’s bid-ask spread and stock 
illiquidity. The dependent variable is bid-ask spread in Panel A and Amihud illiquidity measure in Panel B. %High 
is the ratio of the number of analysts ranking the firm high in their portfolio to the total number of analysts covering 
the firm in a year, and %Low is the ratio of the number of analysts ranking the firm low in their portfolio to the total 
number of analysts covering the firm in a year. See Appendix A for a description of control variables. Year and firm 
fixed effects are included. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Bid-ask spread       
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
% high -0.118*** -0.169*** -0.120*** 
  (4.10) (5.69) (4.20) 
% low 0.039* 0.036* 0.030 
  (1.87) (1.75) (1.39) 
No. of Analysts -0.003* -0.003** -0.003* 
  (1.87) (1.97) (1.83) 
Size -1.332*** -1.247*** -1.305*** 
  (12.93) (12.39) (12.71) 
Size2 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 
  (13.93) (13.37) (13.72) 
Log(trading volume) -0.242*** -0.259*** -0.243*** 
  (3.87) (4.02) (3.87) 
Log(trading volume)2 0.005** 0.007*** 0.005** 
  (2.04) (2.70) (2.04) 
Institutional holding -0.197 -0.185 -0.185 
  (1.61) (1.52) (1.47) 
Institutional holding2 0.255** 0.237** 0.260** 
  (2.50) (2.33) (2.52) 
BM 0.062 0.062 0.06 
  (1.59) (1.59) (1.53) 
Leverage 0.223*** 0.226*** 0.222*** 
  (3.94) (4.00) (3.93) 
Log(price) -0.346*** -0.343** -0.348*** 
  (14.85) (15.16) (14.80) 
Past Ret -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.067*** 
  (9.32) (9.19) (9.31) 
ROA 0.042 0.051 0.045 
  (0.66) (0.78) (0.70) 
Volatility 5.373*** 5.233*** 5.388*** 
  (7.36) (7.17) (7.38) 
        
Year FE Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
# of observations 64,011 64,011 64,011 







Panel B: Amihud illiquidity        
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
% high -0.0112*** -0.0137*** -0.0109*** 
  (2.81) (3.28) (2.72) 
% low 0.0063 0.0086* 0.0087* 
  (1.27) (1.79) (1.81) 
No. of Analysts -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 
  (4.36) (4.41) (4.35) 
        
Controls (Table 7, Panel A) Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
# of observations 64,011 64,011 64,011 





Table 8: Implied costs of equity capital  
 
This table reports the analysis of the impact of analysts’ effort allocation on a firm’s implied cost of capital. The 
dependent variable is the implied cost of capital (multiplied by 100) in Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 
(2001). %High is the ratio of the number of analysts ranking the firm high in their portfolio to the total number of 
analysts covering the firm in a year, and %Low is the ratio of the number of analysts ranking the firm low in their 
portfolio to the total number of analysts covering the firm in a year. See Appendix A for a description of control 
variables. Year and firm fixed effects are included. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent 




  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
        
% high -0.259** -0.241** -0.243** 
  (2.29) (2.01) (2.11) 
% low 0.193** 0.142* 0.108 
  (2.34) (1.78) (1.22) 
No. of Analysts -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* 
  (1.67) (1.69) (1.70) 
Size -0.099 -0.113 -0.223 
  (0.25) (0.30) (0.57) 
Size2 0.008 0.006 0.012 
  (0.60) (0.47) (0.86) 
Log(trading volume) -0.082 -0.116 -0.085 
  (0.38) (0.54) (0.39) 
Log(trading volume)2 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.29) (0.39) (0.29) 
Institutional holding -0.322 -0.340 -0.156 
  (0.68) (0.72) (0.33) 
Institutional holding2 0.225 0.236 0.165 
  (0.57) (0.60) (0.42) 
MAE of forecasts -0.052 -0.050 -0.051 
  (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) 
Earnings variability 0.075 0.075 0.075 
  (0.92) (0.91) (0.91) 
Dispersion of analyst forecasts 0.182* 0.181* 0.183* 
  (1.89) (1.90) (1.90) 
BM 1.766*** 1.678*** 1.764*** 
  (8.75) (8.05) (8.73) 
Leverage 1.621*** 1.672*** 1.681*** 
  (5.35) (4.59) (4.60) 
Past Ret -0.084* -0.079* -0.083* 
  (1.86) (1.76) (1.85) 
Long-term growth 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
  (3.23) (3.15) (3.22) 
Beta 0.019 0.019 0.019 
  (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) 
Volatility 4.404* 4.277 4.310* 
  (1.68) (1.63) (1.65) 
    
Year FE Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y 
# of observations 34,219 34,219 34,219 




Table 9: Coverage termination and information asymmetry 
 
This table reports the average differences in difference-in-difference (DiD) for firm-level information environment 
measures between High and Low groups. We compute the effect of coverage terminations on changes in 3- and 6-
month bid-ask spreads (Panel A) and Amihud’s illiquidity measures (Panel B). For each treatment firm, we first 
follow Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) and Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) to construct a control group. 
For each treatment stock, we choose up to five stocks that are closest in terms of the relevant pre-event information 
asymmetry measure. We then employ a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to compare the change in the 
information environment of control firms to treatment firms. We further split the affected firms into High and Low 
groups based on the firms’ rankings (high or low) in the analysts’ portfolios in the year before the brokerage house 
closures and mergers and report the mean differences in DiD for firm-level information environment measures 
between High and Low groups. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
        
  Difference in DiD between the High and Low groups 
High and low based on Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
Panel A: bid-ask spread       
3 month window 0.137*** 0.125** 0.136*** 
6 month window 0.120** 0.102* 0.118** 
        
Panel B: Amihud illiquidity measure       
3 month window 0.011* 0.007 0.012** 
6 month window 0.018** 0.009 0.017** 





Table 10: Analysts’ effort allocation and labor market outcomes 
 
This table presents logistic regression results for the effect of analysts’ effort allocation on their labor market outcomes. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if an analyst is named an all-star analyst (Panel A) or promoted (Panel B) in a given year. The variables of interest are the Diff(High-
low) in DFREQ and PMAFE. These variables capture the analyst-specific difference in his/her revision frequency and forecast error for high vs. low stocks in 
his/her portfolio. The greater this difference, the more strategically is the analyst allocating effort. All control variables are lagged by one year. See Appendix A 
for a description of control variables. Year fixed effects are included. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors clustered 
at the firm and analyst level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: All-star analysis             
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
High and Low based on: Market cap Trading volume Ownership Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
       
Diff(High-low) in DFREQ 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.086***       
  (3.91) (3.61) (4.30)       
Diff(High-low) in PMAFE       -0.107** -0.117*** -0.136*** 
        (2.42) (2.64) (3.05) 
GExp 0.009 0.009 0.01 0.008 0.008 0.009 
  (1.14) (1.07) (1.27) (1.04) (1.01) (1.14) 
Portsize 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
  (4.95) (4.93) (4.61) (4.86) (4.89) (4.53) 
SIC2 -0.023* -0.023 -0.025* -0.023 -0.023 -0.025* 
  (1.65) (1.62) (1.78) (1.62) (1.64) (1.79) 
Brokerage size 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
  (23.44) (23.42) (23.50) (23.50) (23.52) (23.56) 
Average PMAFE -0.744*** -0.739*** -0.743*** -0.714*** -0.722*** -0.705*** 
  (8.63) (8.58) (8.57) (8.14) (8.28) (7.94) 
Average DFREQ 0.352*** 0.352*** 0.349*** 0.376*** 0.375*** 0.375*** 
  (13.10) (13.06) (12.70) (14.27) (14.27) (13.96) 
Average firm size 0.297*** 0.299*** 0.290*** 0.299*** 0.297*** 0.290*** 
  (11.12) (11.21) (10.79) (11.18) (11.15) (10.82) 
Lag (All-star) 5.509*** 5.511*** 5.491*** 5.520*** 5.521*** 5.506*** 
  (70.86) (70.89) (70.79) (71.06) (71.09) (70.95) 
              
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R2 0.678 0.678 0.677 0.678 0.678 0.677 





Panel B: Move-up analysis             
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
High and Low based on:  Market cap Trading volume Ownership Market cap Trading volume Ownership 
              
Diff(High-low) in DFREQ 0.206** 0.232** 0.187**       
  (2.24) (2.47) (2.05)       
Diff(High-low) in PMAFE       -0.477** -0.242 -0.408** 
        (2.41) (1.13) (2.04) 
GExp -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.059*** 
  (2.72) (2.82) (2.83) (2.61) (2.64) (2.71) 
Portsize 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.005 
  (0.31) (0.37) (0.56) (0.33) (0.23) (0.53) 
SIC2 -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.149*** -0.155*** -0.153*** -0.149*** 
  (4.27) (4.26) (4.14) (4.31) (4.25) (4.13) 
Brokerage size 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
  (8.22) (8.15) (8.33) (8.22) (8.27) (8.37) 
Average PMAFE -0.818* -0.787* -0.903** -0.721* -0.799* -0.954** 
  (1.94) (1.89) (2.13) (1.70) (1.91) (2.20) 
Average DFREQ -0.075 -0.098 -0.088 -0.048 -0.047 -0.049 
  (-0.86) (1.10) (0.98) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) 
Average firm size 0.135** 0.137** 0.127** 0.134** 0.141** 0.129** 
  (2.41) (2.46) (2.22) (2.39) (2.54) (2.29) 
              
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.094 0.095 0.093 0.092 0.094 
# of observations 14,654 14,655 14,413 14,638 14,630 14,387 
 
